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Introduction 
In this paper, we provide a guide for policymakers who consider using tradeable permits as an 
environmental policy tool.  Most of the issues we discuss are relevant both in the domestic 
and the international realm, although some have particular significance in one of the two 
areas. 
 
In recent years, tradeable permits (TP) have become rather widespread in use
1. The following 
table 1 gives an overview of some of the numerous experiments, in particular in the US. 
There is a wealth of resources available that comment on the success of these programs 
(Stavins 2002). One noteworthy point is that the international experience is rather small. 
Europe has only relatively recently begun to develop such programs. For example, in 
Denmark, the Ministry of the Environment fixes annual emissions ceilings in the power 
generation industry, and leaves the actual allocation to the country's two power plant 
consortia. The UK allowed intra-firm trading of SO2-allowances among large combustion 
plants from 1991 to 1997. But inter-firm trading was not allowed (Sorrell 1999).  
 
                                                 
1 This should not obscure the fact, however, that tradeable permits are not the only game in town. In 
fact, important tradeoffs with alternative environmental policy instruments need to be considered. For 
space reasons, it is not possible to adequately deal with these tradeoffs here, and so we can only point 
the reader to the more extensive survey (Wagner and Schneider 2003) where questions like the 
optimal timing of environmental policy in the presence of significant uncertainties and irreversibilities 
and the relative merits of different policy instruments with respect to cost efficiency, environmental 
effectiveness, administrative practicability, dynamic efficiency and incentives for technological 
innovation, and political acceptability are discussed (Summary tables of the relative advantages and 
disadvantages can be found in the appendix of this paper). One particularly important insight 
developed recently in a number of papers (Abel et al. 1995; Arrow and Fisher 1974; Chao 1995; Dixit 
and Pindyck 1998; Hassett and Metcalf 1994; Kolstad 1992; Pindyck 2000) concerns the fact that 
policy decisions with respect to climate change are essentially irreversible and delay of action is 
possible. Under these conditions, waiting has optionality value; thus, the observed delay in climate 
policy implementations may at least partially be an optimal response to the prevailing uncertainties.   3
Table 1: Some selected tradeable permit systems (Stavins 2002) 
Country Program  Traded  Commodity  Period of 
Operation 






CFCs and Methyl 
Chloroform; HCFCs; 




Low trading volume, except 
among large methyl bromide 
allowance holders  
 PERT  GERT  Nox, VOCs, CO, SO2 
CO2  
1996-present; 







rights trading among 
stationary source  
1995-present 
Low trading volume; decrease in 
emissions since 1997 not 





ODS production quotas 
under Montreal 
Protocol  
1991-1994  More rapid phaseout of ODS  
Singapore  ODS Permit 
Trading 
Permits for use and 
distribution of ODS   1991-present  Increase in permit prices; 











Criteria air pollutants 
under CAA   1974-present  Performance unaffected; savings 
= $5-12 billion  
  Lead Gasoline 
Phasedown 
Rights for lead in 
gasoline among 
refineries  
1982-1987  More rapid phaseout of leaded 
gasoline; $250 m annual savings 
  Water Quality 
Trading 
Point-nonpoint sources 
of nitrogen and 
phosphorus  
1984-1986  No trading occurred because 





Production rights for 
some CFCs, based on 
depletion potential  
1987-present 
Environmental targets achieved 
ahead of schedule; effect of TP 
system unclear  
  Heavy Duty 
Engine Trading 
Averaging, banking, 
and trading of credits 
for NOx and particulate 
emissions  
1992-present  Standards achieved; cost savings 
unknown  
  Acid Rain 
Reduction 
SO2 emission reduction 
credits; mainly among 
electric utilities  
1995-present 
SO2 reductions achieved ahead 
of schedule; savings of $1 
billion/year  
  RECLAIM 
Program 
SO2 and NOx emissions 
among stationary 
sources  
1994-present Unknown   
  N.E. Ozone 
Transport 
Primarily NOX 
emissions by large 
stationary sources  
1999-present Unknown   
   4
The system in the Netherlands, where electric power producers face emissions standards for 
SO2 and NOx but can comply through cost-sharing arrangements whereby plants with higher 
abatement costs are compensated, has resulted in intra-firm trading (Klaassen and Nentjes 
1997). In Germany, the transfer of emission reduction obligations among firms in air quality 
non-attainment areas is allowed. The cost-savings have been estimated to be very limited 
(Schaerer 1994). The most recent experiment with market-based instruments is the UK 
Emission Trading Scheme, aimed at achieving the UK's commitment under the - yet to be 
ratified - Kyoto Protocol. Schneider and Wagner (2002) describe the program in detail. Since 
the first auction only took place in March 2002, and trading has been somewhat limited so 
far, it is too early to make an assessment concerning the success of the program. 
 
What lessons can we learn from these programs, some of which have been “grand policy 
experiments” (Stavins 1998)? In this guide for policymakers, we focus exclusively on design 
and implementation issues and we draw on theoretical and empirical work on this question. 
Of course, there is no blueprint for the perfect system. It is our belief, however, that when 
tradeable permit systems are used where they are appropriate, then heeding the lessons from 
the past increases the chances of the system leading to the desired outcome (in particular a 
cost-effective attainment of pre-set environmental goals). The balance of the paper deals with 
ten such key design issues. 
Trading of emissions versus inputs 
In principle, we would want to regulate risks and impacts. However, it is quite difficult to 
trade risks directly. This is why policy typically moves one or two steps away from this level, 
leading to either emission permit trading or input permit trading. For example, a true CO2 
trading program would correspond to the first type; a carbon (content) trading program 
belongs to the second group. In general, the choice between the two depends on the degree of 
uniform mixing of the pollutant. For example, it would be problematic to have a sulfur-
content trading program because SO2 is a highly non-uniformly mixed pollutant - which is 
why the US has chosen to implement an SO2 allowance trading program. Aside from this 
physical property, there is also an economic or political aspect:  administrative feasibility. 
Clearly, the closer to the actual impacts regulation takes place, the more complex it gets. 
Taken together, these two factors suggest an important trade-off.    5
Mandatory versus voluntary 
Some observers have argued that a mandatory scheme is likely to be more environmentally 
effective. This is not necessarily true since significant emissions reductions may also be 
attained through voluntary participation. What is correct, however, is that mandatory schemes 
will in all likelihood be more cost-effective. Why? Under a voluntary scheme only entities 
that expect themselves to be sellers will join the scheme (even if they end up being buyers 
after all). In other words, there is a strong element of adverse selection involved, as has been 
shown for the case of the SO2 program by Montero2 (1999). Thus, abatement cost 
heterogeneity will be lower under a voluntary scheme, leading – for a given environmental 
goal – to lower cost-savings. Transaction costs for companies joining industrial opt-in 
programs have typically been high (Atkeson 1997). 
Absolute versus relative baselines 
Typically, the difference between relative and absolute targets is argued to be as follows 
(Bode 2002): One limits total emissions to some absolute amount and may therefore limit 
“growth,“ while the other is presumed to impose less of a constraint on growth in output, 
albeit at the cost of some growth in emissions. As Ellerman (2002) points out, the U.S. 
experience with both systems does not provide much support for this distinction3. But it is 
not clear whether this experience is also relevant for the choice of baselines in climate change 
policy, for example. Indeed, one of the major components of the US Climate Plan announced 
in February 2002 is the concept of moving away from committing to a national emission cap 
by a specified date (such as is embodied in Kyoto) to a targeted rate of decline in emissions 
intensity of the economy. Kolstad (2002) argues that this part of the proposal does have some 
merit, on the grounds that it addresses the problem with the emissions cap approach of Kyoto 
that requires continual renegotiation of the caps as we proceed through time. It also does not 
have the (psychological and possibly real) effect of hindering growth for developing 
                                                 
2 However, the environmental effects must be kept in perspective. The number of allowances that 
could be considered excess amounted to only 3% of the total issued during 1995-1999 and the 
inflation of the cap during the time when these banked allowances will be used is only about 2%. 
Thus, these effects do not appear to have threatened the overall integrity of the allowance program. 
3 On the one hand, the consumption of coal has not been perceptibly reduced by the imposition of a 
cap on sulfur dioxide emissions. Rather, more low-sulfur coal is produced and a number of units have 
retrofitted scrubbers. On the other hand, the lead phase-down, which is the prototypical averaging (i.e. 
relative baseline) program, has not lead to more output of leaded gasoline.    6
countries. Finally, an intensity target has the advantage of resolving some uncertainty, since 
other the absolute baseline significant cost uncertainty arises from a combination of 
uncertainty over how much an economy may grow by the time the commitment period 
arrives. The last word is still out on this issue. 
 
Apart from this, two other reasons argue for using absolute baselines in national programs. 
The problem is that without a specified baseline, reductions must be credited to an 
unobservable hypothetical – what the source would have emitted in the absence of the 
regulation. Second, as was experienced with EPA’s Emissions Trading Program, relative 
baselines create significant transaction costs by essentially requiring prior approval of trades 
as the authority investigates the claimed counterfactual from which reductions are calculated 
and credits generated (Nichols, Farr, and Hester 1996). 
Grandfathering versus auction 
Almost all emission trading programs in action have started with grandfathered permits. For 
example, the most important emission trading program so far, the Clean Air Act amendments 
of 1990 dealing with SO2 trading provide for annual auctions in addition to grandfathering - 
but such auctions involve less than three percent of the total allocation. Overall, the auctions 
have proven to be a trivial part of the overall program (Joskow, Schmalensee, and Bailey 
1996). This is astounding since on the theoretical level, there seem to be compelling reasons 
for auctioned permits.  
 
First of all, with perfect information and no transaction costs, trading will result in the 
economically efficient outcome independently of the initial distribution of permits 
(Montgomery 1972). Second, auctions are more cost-effective in the presence of certain kinds 
of transaction costs. Third, the revenue raised can be used to reduce other distortions 
(Goulder and Bovenberg 1996). Note also that while instruments such as tradeable permits 
can create entry barriers that raise product prices, reduce the real wage, and exacerbate 
preexisting labor supply distortions, this effect can be offset if the government auctions the 
permits, retains the scarcity rents, and recycles the revenue by reducing distortionary labor 
taxes. Fourth, auctions provide greater incentives for firms to develop substitutes (see the 
section on technological progress). Fifth, due to the revenue raised by auctions, administrative 
agencies may have a bigger incentive to monitor compliance (Ackermann and Stewart 1985).   7
Finally, grandfathering can lead unregulated firms to increase their emissions in order to 
maximize the pollution rights that they obtain if there is a transition to a market-based system 
(Dewees 1983). Overall, under almost any circumstances to be encountered in the real world, 
an auction of emission rights is preferable to grandfathering.  
 
In addition to these considerations, questions of equity but also of dynamic efficiency will 
guide the treatment of new sources. Obviously, the decision will depend on the 
competitiveness of the market – the policy decision here is as much industrial policy as it is 
environmental policy.  
Allocations and efficiency in the international context 
Chichilnisky (1993) and Chichilnisky and Heal (1994) point out that the presumption that 
equal marginal abatement costs are the correct condition for efficiency is not strictly correct. 
The reason for this is that, simply, a dollar to a person in the developing world does not have 
the same welfare implications as a dollar to a developed world person. What matters are the 
real opportunity costs. Formally, the authors find that Pareto efficiency requires that the 
marginal cost of abatement in each country must be inversely related to that country's 
marginal valuation for the private good. This has strong policy implications: If richer 
countries have a lower marginal valuation of the private good, then at a Pareto-efficient 
allocation, they should have a larger marginal cost of abatement than the lower-income 
countries. With diminishing returns to abatement, this implies that they should push 
abatement further. Summarizing, the allocation of property rights in a tradeable permit system 
is important if environmental quality has a direct impact on wellbeing and marginal 
valuations of private goods differ strongly across countries. 
 
The main policy implication for the design of efficient permit trading programs concerns the 
allocation of rights. Even after choosing to go with tradeable permits as the environmental 
policy instrument, we need to carefully use the degree of freedom left in terms of the 
distribution of property rights4. Whenever politicians bring up equity issues, economists are 
                                                 
4 Chichilnisky et al. (2000) concentrate on the first welfare theorem in markets in which agents trade, 
at a uniform price (that is, not at personalized Lindahl prices), permits to produce privately produced 
public goods. They take the total quantity of permits fixed by the government at a level consistent 
with Pareto efficiency. They show that the equilibria are nevertheless generally inefficient, due to the 
public good character of one of the traded goods. But the main surprise is that there exist certain 
allocations of rights to emit from which the market overcomes the "free rider" problem and achieves   8
quick to point out that those have nothing to do with efficiency. For once it seems that 
politicians are right, if not in their reasoning.  
Banking and borrowing 
The US has had significant experience with programs that allow intertemporal trading, in 
particular banking. Two lessons emerge from this experience (Ellerman 2002): First, when 
allowed and coupled with a phased-in reduction requirement, banking will be used and it will 
accelerate the timing of emission reductions. Studies of the US Acid Rain Program also find 
that firms have learned very well how to optimally accumulate and draw down banks 
(Ellerman and Montero 2002). Second, the ability of banking to dampen allowance price 
fluctuations may be important when the spatial scope of the cap is limited5. In fact, this 
second point hints at the importance of a temporal safety valve that may allow agents to 
borrow in times of extraordinary demand. Of course, there is good reason to restrict temporal 
flexibility when the environmental problem is other than a stock pollutant. 
Market power and the design of emission permit markets 
In order for cost minimization gains to be fully realized, the emission trading market must 
work in a competitive manner. If some agents have the capacity to influence the transaction 
price of traded permits or can prevent the entrance of competitors by hoarding permits, 
efficiency losses may ensue (OECD 2001). For example, Hahn (1984a) shows that the 
deviation of abatement costs from the cost minimum is related to the extent to which the 
initial distribution of permits differs from the equilibrium distribution (and to the price 
elasticity of demand).  
 
Another type of strategic behavior occurs if firms use the permit market to drive up rivals' 
costs (exclusionary manipulation). Note first that this can only occur if firms operating in the 
same industry also participate in the same permit market. Misiolek and Elder (1989) conclude 
that, surprisingly, this may not necessarily have a negative impact on cost efficiency. It is 
unclear to what extent this result survives the inclusion of uncertainty. Experimental studies 
and anecdotal evidence from existing permit markets suggest that this is probably not a major 
                                                                                                                                                        
efficiency. This is a key characteristic of competitive markets for privately produced public goods. 
5 This was important to bring price levels back to normal in the RECLAIM NOx program in the US 
after the California electricity market crises in late 2000 and early 2001.    9
problem – at least for domestic programs. On the international level, things may look 
different. As regards carbon trading, a particularly important danger seems to be that Russia 
and the Ukraine exert market power. In a first attempt to estimate the costs of such a situation, 
Burniaux (1999) finds that by 2010 the price of Assigned Amount Units (the term for 
emission permits that the Kyoto protocol uses) would be about 20 per cent higher than under 
the competitive scenario (for a discussion see OECD (2001)). Clearly, the best way to avoid 
such situations is for governments to devolve their assigned amounts to their legal entities and 
promote industry-level trading (Bader 1996; Hahn 1984b). 
Market efficiency, transaction costs  
If we want to rely on environmental markets to give us efficient results, we must be able to 
rely on them in providing informational or market efficiency first. One key to a smooth 
functioning of the tradeable permit market is a low level of transaction costs.  
 
Three potential sources of transaction costs in tradeable permit markets can be identified: (1) 
search and information; (2) bargaining and decision (Dwyer 1992; Kohn 1991); and (3) 
monitoring and enforcement. Anecdotal evidence abounds regarding the prevalence of 
significant transaction costs in tradeable permit markets. Atkinson and Tietenberg (1991) 
surveyed six empirical studies that found trading levels in permit markets to be lower than 
anticipated by theoretical models. On the other hand, it has been recognized that success 
stories like the EPA’s leaded gasoline phasedown can partially be attributed to the program’s 
minimal administrative requirements and the fact that the potential trading partners 
(refineries) were already experienced at striking deals with one another6. Transaction costs in 
the SO2 market in the US – the most successful TP market - are now minimal. The lesson for 
policymakers is to make administrative procedures as simple as possible and to equip 
potential trading partners with means to efficiently communicate market-relevant information 
with each other7.  
 
                                                 
6 For an overview of quantitative empirical estimates across various programs, we refer the reader to 
Wagner and Schneider (2003) 
7 Not only the level of transaction costs is important. Stavins (1995) shows that when transaction costs 
are dependent on the volume traded, this may imply that the final equilibrium, and hence cost 
efficiency, is no longer independent of the initial distribution of permits (the precise result depends on 
the exact shape of transaction costs)..   10
A final word is in order on the international realm. When governments themselves trade, 
transactions could be the result of bilateral bargaining where emission permits are not the 
only element of the transaction; in other words, governments will in general be motivated by 
other factors than strict economic ones. Prior notification by parties and, more generally, the 
establishment of specific exchanges has been advocated to promote competitive behavior 
(Bohm 1998). First experiments (Hizen and Saijo 1999) seem to indicate, however, that 
disclosure of contract information does generally not improve market efficiency. Similarly, 
trading through an exchange does not seem to improve significantly the efficiency of the 
trading regime as opposed to bilateral trading. These results are surprising and merit further 
investigation.  
Enforcement and management framework 
There are two aspects to an enforcement framework: One is the monitoring of compliance 
with the regulatory framework and detecting violations. The other is responding to violations 
in a way that ensures that it is always in the interests of participants to comply. Often, the first 
aspect is the simpler of the two. For example, for CO2, since it is a mostly uniformly mixed 
pollutant, we do not have to monitor each and every source of CO2 emissions, but can focus 
on the sales of the major distributors of carbon-based fuels. In fact, just from such sources, 
estimates of the consumption of various carbon-based fuels in each country are already 
available from data on production, import, export, and inventories8.  
 
The enforcement poses much more serious problems, in particular in the international 
context. Malik (1990) demonstrates that with imperfect compliance, firms set the level of 
emissions such that marginal profits equal the permit price plus the expected fine. It can also 
be shown that if the marginal penalty of noncompliance is constant, tradeable emission 
permits lead to less noncompliance than does regulation. With increasing marginal penalties 
(as a function of the violation), all firms will comply if the permit price below the expected 
per unit violation penalty. With decreasing marginal penalties, firms that decide not to 
comply will pollute more than under regulation. In sum, with imperfect enforcement, whether 
or not tradeable permits meet the environmental goal depends on the structure of the penalty 
function.  
                                                 
8 It should be noted that if the lives of quotas are not synchronized - if they specify a total of emissions 
over a multiyear life - matters could be more difficult   11
 
With respect to market management more generally, the clear recommendation from 
economic theory is to allow market participants to fully exploit cost-saving opportunities and 
risk-management possibilities, for example through the use of derivatives (as they are already 
traded in the SO2 and NOx allowance markets in the US). In addition to facilitating heding 
price risks, derivatives also help achieve market depth and liquididy and so improve market 
functioning.  
Interaction between international and domestic policies and needs 
Sometimes it is argued that it does not matter how countries enforce given total emission 
levels domestically, as long as the allocation of quotas among countries is clear "...in 
principle, any domestic policy regime is possible." (Chichilnisky and Heal 2000). Hahn and 
Stavins (1999) deal criticially with this important point, which has received surprisingly little 
attention in the literature on international environmental agreements.  
 
They start from the observation that the Kyoto Protocol's greenhouse gas trading mechanism 
will lead to minimized costs if all countries use domestic tradeable permit systems to meet 
their national targets and allow for international trades. Thus, the European Union's proposal 
to introduce a trading system within Europe to fulfull the requirements of Kyoto, indeed is 
very important for the overall performance of Kyoto's system. By contrast, political practice 
suggests that many countries will use non-trading approaches such as greenhouse-gas taxes or 
fixed quantity standards. Hahn and Stavins show that in these cases, achieving the potential 
cost savings of international trading requires some form of project-by-project credit program - 
like joint implementation. However, large transaction costs, likely government participation, 
and absence of a well-functioning market may be obstacles for this toute. Overall, there is an 
important trade-off between the degree of domestic sovereignty and the degree of cost-
effectiveness.  
 
A related question is how to link existing schemes, for example the Danish and the UK CO2 
schemes (Bode 2002). Again, as long as the abatement costs in separated trading schemes are 
different, the linkage of two schemes can result in increased overall cost-effectiveness. There 
will be equity considerations, however, since prices will change compared to the previous 
equilibrium. This may raise resistance by the loosing participants in advance of the linking of   12
schemes. Bode (2002) discusses in detail how the linkage of schemes and differences in 
design features like those discussed in the present paper interact with each other. Obviously, 
there are also often difficult legal issues involved (Rodi 2002). 
Summary 
Tradable permit programs have been in use in the United States for a long time and are also 
on their way to becoming a very popular environmental policy instrument in Europe. This 
guide has aimed to highlight ten of the most important issues in designing a successful 
tradable permit program. 
1.  The choice of trading of emissions versus trading of inputs (e.g. CO2 trading versus 
carbon content trading) depends on the degree to which the pollutant is uniformly mixed. 
2.  In most instances, mandatory schemes will be more cost-effective. They avoid adverse 
selection problems in participation. 
3.  Many arguments speak for the use of absolute baselines in national programs. We have 
also pointed out, however, that the concept of targeting a decline in CO2 emissions 
intensity in the economy may have some merit. 
4.  The clear economic advice is to auction off permits instead of grandfathering them. Of 
course, political feasibility considerations will often make this impossible. 
5.  Initial allocations may be important for efficiency when there is a high degree of 
inequality in wealth between the trading entities, for example, in the international context. 
6.  Temporal flexibility should be allowed to as large extent as environmental effectiveness 
allows it. 
7.  The market management authority needs to be careful to avoid anti-competitive behavior 
on the market, although existing studies seem to indicate that strategic behavior on 
tradable permit markets is not an important phenomenon. 
8.  Participating firms and other entities must have the ability to quickly communicate in 
order to keep transactions costs low. 
9.  Continual monitoring of compliance and enforcement of the “rules of the game” of a 
tradeable permit program are essential ingredients in reducing uncertainty for market 
participants and to secure environmental effectiveness. 
10. The design of national emissions programs in the presence of international agreements is 
difficult. Linking existing schemes inevitably produces losers who may need to be 
compensated.   13
Appendix 
 
Table A1: Instruments of environmental policy and criteria to evaluate them  
 
 Instrument   
Dimension   Emission 
Charges  
Tradeable 
permits   Regulation  
Cost efficiency   +   +   -  
Environmental effectiveness -   +   +  
Administrative practicability +   +   +  
Dynamic efficiency   +   +   0  
Political acceptability   0   0/+   +  
 
 
"+"=high, "-"=low, "0"=neutral.  
Source: Klaassen (1996), Wagner and Schneider (2003) 
 
Table A2: Conditions affecting cost efficiency and environmental effectiveness  
  Cost efficiency   Environmental effectiveness 
  Charges Permits Regulation Charges Permits Regulation  
Uncertainty about 
costs   -   0   -   -   0   ?  
Imperfect markets   -   -   ?   -   0   ?  
Transaction costs   0   -   0   0   0   0  
Imperfect enforcement 0   -   ?   0/-   -   -  
Discontinuous control  0   0   -   -   0   0  
Cost-saving techn. 
Progress   -   0   ?   ?   0   0  
Economic growth   0   0   0   -   0   -  
Inflation   0   0   0   -   0   0  
 
 
"-"= negative impact; "0" = no impact; "?" = unknown  
Source: Klaassen (1996), Wagner and Schneider (2003) 
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